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1The Financial Alchemy that Failed 1
Marcus Miller
University of Warwick
December 2018
The financial crisis [of 2008] and the economic, political and geopolitical
responses are essential to understanding the changing face of the world today.
Adam Tooze (2018)
Introduction
With his conception of successive ‘Ages of Capitalism’, Anatole Kaletsky
provides a canvas broad enough to encompass the banking crisis of 2008 and
much more. After briefly outlining the Four Ages he identifies, we focus on the
period of the Great Moderation when Inflation Targeting seemed to have
solved the problem macroeconomic management – until it ended in
spectacular failure.
The rapid growth of cross-border banking – with securitized assets funded by
wholesale money – evidently posed threats to financial stability that had been
ignored by a regime targeting consumer prices. We look at three: the
pecuniary externalities exerted by asset price changes on investment banking;
information failures leading to an exaggerated banking boom; and the risk of
insolvency in the subsequent ‘bank run’.
The financial system pre-crash was, it seems, flawed by two Fallacies of
Composition: by regulation that reckoned making individual banks safe
guaranteed systemic stability; and a business model that reckoned
securitization ensured liquidity whenever necessary. Finally, we discuss how, in
different countries, the law has variously been invoked to handle reckless
banking.
1Written for conference on ‘The 2008 Global Financial Crisis in Retrospect’ (organized by R.Z.Aliber
and G. Zoega at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik in August, 2018), the paper has benefitted
greatly from comments received; but responsibility for errors and omissions rests with the author.
2Section 1: The Four Ages of Capitalism
Like Mammon, the fallen angel in Milton’s Paradise Lost whose ‘looks and
thoughts were always downward bent, admiring more the riches of heaven’s
pavement , trodden gold, than aught else’, economists are often blamed for
focusing more on the minutiae of their models than on the wider lessons of
history. With his broad-brush view of the evolution of capitalism in the West,
Kaletsky (2010) offers an antidote, however. Since the origins of capitalism in
the Industrial Revolution, he counts on three major crises to define Four Ages,
as indicated in column three of the Table below.
Table 1 Kaletsky’s Four Ages of Capitalism
Duration Setting Economics Politics Challenges/crises
1 1830 -
1914
(crises
after WWI)
Era of
Imperialism and
the Gold
standard.
Victorian age
Laissez Faire
Balanced
budgets.
Night watchman
state
Shock of WWI;
war debts &
hyperinflation;
Wall Street crash
and Great
Depression.
2 1934 -
1960
(crises in
60s and
70s)
Dollar Standard,
with rule-based
international
economic order,
with IMF, World
Bank, WTO.
Keynesian
age of
demand
management
Big Government
(FDR: New
Deal) Post-war
US leadership of
world economic
order.
Global Inflation:
Oil price shocks of
1973/81; union
power
3 1980 -
2008
Free market
fundamentalism;
with Floating
rates and
Deregulation.
Globalisation
with Regionalism
‘Great
Moderation’:
Monetarism
followed by
Inflation
Targeting
Collapse of USSR
in 1990 leading
to ‘Capitalist
Triumphalism’
under Thatcher
and Reagan
Global financial
crisis of 2008:
followed by Great
Recession
4 2010 - Unconventional
monetary policy.
US shifts to non-
cooperative
behaviour
Great
Stagnation in
the West - but
not the East
Populism and
protection.
Euro crises. Slow
recovery, low
growth
3The first of these - the Victorian Age of Industrial Revolution in Britain - was
characterised by laissez-faire governance, balanced government budgets and
adherence to the Gold Standard. This period of unparalleled economic growth
came to an end with the Wall Street crash, leading to banking collapse and the
Great Depression.
In the era that followed, the United States emerged as the world’s leading
economy. This, the Keynesian Age, was a period of big government, managing
aggregate demand to reduce mass unemployment - with action led by Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, theory supplied by J.M. Keynes and impetus added by
rearmament and wartime spending. It was, perhaps, a victim of its own success
since, when the global economy got close to capacity and supply-side
constraints began to emerge, there came the Great Inflation. In the view of
John Hicks this inflation had its origins in a real shock - the sharp fall in the real
earning power of labour due to the rise in the price of primary products – oil
being the obvious case in point2.
Faced with the challenge of inflation, the Bretton Woods system of pegged
exchange rates ended in 1973. Thereafter many OECD countries opted for
floating exchange rates together with anti-inflationary monetary policy3,
guided by the view of Milton Friedman that there was no long run trade-off
between output and inflation.
Economists worked on developing a ‘monetary theory of exchange rates’ to
describe this brave new world4. In broad-brush terms, this asset-based
approach implied that, with each country free to choose the growth rate for its
money supply, the global outcome would be an inflation rate reflecting the
average of these monetary choices, and exchange rate changes that duly
reflected the differences. With prudent monetary policy at the national level,
stability of the global system seemed assured.
2 This shock ‘we have to face in terms of traditional economics, waking up from the sweet Keynesian dreams
that have been with us so long... It is the attempt to bring about such a fall by a lag in money wages behind
money prices that is the principal cause of the acceleration of inflation.’ Hicks (1975, p.19).
3 With European countries later clubbing together to create the euro, delegating to the ECB the task of
conducting monetary policy for the Eurozone as a whole.
4 See for example Bilson (1978) and Frenkel (1976) ,
4Before long, however, the monetary targets Friedman recommended were
replaced by Inflation Targeting, using the Taylor rule for setting interest rates -
with expectations taken to be rational rather than adaptive – leading to the
Great Moderation of 1985 -2007. Broadly speaking, the experience of OECD
countries in the period of the Great Moderation seemed to support the
perspective that Friedman had advanced, that floating exchange rates and
anti-inflationary monetary policy would deliver financial stability. There were,
it is true, successive and severe crises in ‘emerging markets’ leading to sharp
falls in their exchange rates – the fall of the Mexican peso in 1996, and of East
Asia currencies in 1998, for example: but these could be attributed to investor
panic, inadequate financial regulation or ‘crony capitalism’ in countries that
had not reached ‘advanced’ status.
There were, in addition, financial crises in the US itself – the stock market
break of 1987, the collapse of LTCM in 1998, and a dot-com bubble that burst
in 2001; but with Alan Greenspan as Chair of the Federal Reserve System, the
US financial system seemed to be in capable hands. Widely reckoned to be one
of the world’s finest central bankers, he held the post for five successive terms
(1986 to 2006) and, in 2005, received an honorary knighthood from Queen
Elizabeth for his ‘outstanding contribution to global economic stability’.
Nonetheless, the period ended with the most severe financial crisis since the
1930s. On this occasion, policy-makers - taking to heart the lessons of history –
took extraordinary measures of monetary and fiscal stabilisation to head off a
repeat of the Great Depression.
The Fourth Age is where we are now. There may be problems of deleveraging,
inequality and low growth in the West, but Kaletsky remains optimistic that,
once again, capitalism will find a way forward. Others, President Xi Jinping of
China in particular, take a very different view, offering the Chinese top-down,
one-party approach as an alternative model for growth and development.
5Section 1. The Financial Alchemy that Failed: Three narratives
The focus in this paper is on Third Age and how to account for the Global
Financial Crisis that erupted so soon after Mr Greenspan resigned in 2006. For
John Taylor, the answer is self-evident – the crisis arose because the US had
deviated from his policy rule: after the end of the dot-com bubble, policy rates
in the US were kept ‘too low for too long’. Moreover, exchange rate objectives
– such as ‘competitive devaluations’ - may have accentuated deviations from
rules-based policy, Taylor (2018).
Others see deeper flaws in the way capitalism has been evolving5. From an
empirical perspective, Helene Rey (2013), in her Jackson Hole presentation
Dilemma not Trilemma, challenged the basic Mundell-Fleming open economy
model that offers the prospect of monetary independence for economies that
float. She presents empirical evidence of a Global Financial Cycle, where
monetary conditions in the US affect other countries whether or not they float.
From a more institutional viewpoint, Tobias Adrian, Robert McCauley, Hyun
Shin, and others have argued that the interlinking of economies through cross-
border banking renders the framework of monetary independence associated
with Friedman and Mundell/Fleming out of date. (Evidence of increasing
financial inter-connectedness is provided in Annex A.) The historian Adam
Tooze (2018) gives a comprehensive account of what he calls ‘the re-
globalization of banking’ with particular attention to investment banking - its
transatlantic nature and its reliance on wholesale funding.
On the presumption of efficient financial markets, however, details of money
and banking were absent from the DSGE models used by Central Banks to
implement their Taylor Rules.
5As did Greenspan himself when “in late 2008, he admitted to Congress that the crisis had exposed a “flaw” in
his world view. He had always assumed that bankers would act in ways that would protect shareholders – in
accordance with free-market capitalist theory – but this presumption turned out to be wrong.” Gillian Tett
(2013). See also Greenspan (2013).
6To neglect the impact that investment banking was to have on Congressional
plans for the provision of finance for housing was a fatal error. As Tooze (2018,
pp.47, 48) argues:
American housing policy and mortgage practice since the war had
systematically favoured home ownership for the white majority. In the
1990s promoting home ownership for lower-income and ‘underserved’
minority communities became a congressional priority. …
Many of the new homeowners in the 1990s and the 2000s were ethnic
minority families who had been denied mortgages for decades under the
regime of ‘redlining’ institutionalized by New Deal housing policy. …
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set high minimum standards for the quality
of the loans they would buy. The Government Sponsored Enterprises
didn’t support the kind of low quality, subprime loans that were beginning
to fail in droves in 2005-2006. Those toxic loans were the products of a
new system of mortgage finance by private lenders that came into full
force in the early 2000s.
Instead of taxes and subsidies to redistribute income, the idea was that those
on lower incomes would borrow to get on the housing ladder so – with time
and house price appreciation – they could extract equity to increase
consumption. But with the development of private label securitisation (PLS),
the subprime experiment in ‘dynamic credit enhancement’ for low-income
borrowers accelerated sharply: the injection of private sector finance was
sufficient to upset the applecart. As Rajan (2010, p.38, 9) puts it:
Unfortunately, the private sector, aided and abetted by agency money,
converted the good intentions behind the affordable housing mandate
and the push towards an ownership society into a financial disaster.
The beauty of the investment banking model was that mortgage lending all
across the US would be funded by money at low rates: this was the financial
alchemy promised and practised on Wall Street. Why did it fail? We look at
three plausible narratives6.
Narrative One Pecuniary Externalities in investment banking
6 For further detail, see Miller et al. (2018)
7The basic idea is that asset price changes – which may be due to bank
behaviour - can have powerful, potentially destabilising, feedback effects on
the lending capacity of the banks themselves. How this works is outlined in
Shin (2010, Chapter 3) as follows.
Take two groups of investors holding a given stock of risky assets: own-money
investors, with risk averse preferences on the one hand; and highly-leveraged,
risk-neutral investment banks who borrow heavily to invest in risky assets on
the other. That the latter are operating with ‘other people’s money’ poses
problems of moral hazard: they may take on too much risk, keeping the upside
and leaving the downside to their creditors. To limit this ‘agency’ problem,
creditors and/or regulators can impose balance sheet rules to check excess
risk–like Value at Risk (VaR) rules that ensure such Highly Leveraged
Institutions (HLIs) have some of their own ‘skin in the game’ to cover downside
risk.
So far so good. But such micro-prudential rules, which work to check
idiosyncratic shocks, can generate significant amplification when shocks are
correlated, i.e. they are macro shocks. If, for example, there is public
information to the effect that the risky assets held by both types of investors
are of higher quality than previously supposed7, then this will increase
demand, and, for given supply, raise the market price and increase the equity
of investment banks with monetary liabilities. Assuming that the latter are
keen to grow their business, this extra equity can, under VaR rules, permit an
expansion of investment bank balance sheets - and a rise in their market share
vis a vis risk averse investors without leverage.
This amplification is referred to as a pecuniary externality because it works
through the effect of that market-clearing prices have on the balance sheet
7 i.e. are less risky and/or have higher expected payoff
8restrictions which govern the investment behaviour of individual banks, Davila
and Korinek, 2017. 8
To check such externalities is the task of Macro-prudential regulation. This may
involve leverage caps and cyclical capital buffers, liquidity requirements and,
perhaps, Pigovian taxes on capital gains and structural changes to limit the
build-up of leverage in the financial sector.
From this perspective, with cross-border banking and VaR rules – but no Macro
Pru – the Western banking system was exposed to significant threats of
instability before the financial crisis.
Narrative Two: Information failures
Myopia and the leverage cycle
Shin’s Investment Banking model assumes common knowledge of the true
quality of risk assets on the market. In analysing what they call the “Basel
leverage cycle”, Aymans et al. (2016) assume banks are myopic in assessing
risk, judging assets to be safe in periods of calm even though their stochastic
properties have remained unchanged. In their model of investment banking -
rather like the Shin model discussed above, but with a dynamic framework
where non- banks are ‘noise traders’ and banks get recapitalised if they lose
equity - they obtain a Minsky-style cycle, where asset prices rise steadily for a
while as investment banks expand, before crashing as risk assets are dumped
in fire-sales.
This analysis claims to describe forces operating at the time of the Great
Moderation - a dramatic challenge to the glib assumption that price and
output stability are sufficient for Financial Stability.
8 They base their discussion on the “Credit Cycles” model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) where the borrowers
are farmers subject to the balance sheet rule that borrowing be collateralised by the land they hold: this works
well for idiosyncratic shocks to farmer productivity, but correlated productivity shocks generate amplification
through the price of land.
9Asymmetric information and cheating
In Phishing for Phools, Akerlof and Shiller (2015, p.36) stress the role of
information asymmetries and the temptation to cheat that they provide. They
argue that the degree of risk involved in subprime assets was initially grossly
understated, as credit rating agencies (CRAs) – skilled in assessing repayment
prospects for the debt of corporations and sovereigns – were paid by the banks
to give favourable ratings to complex financial products whose properties defied
the type of analysis they were used to. (Such an allegation has been
substantiated by subsequent findings in the law courts against Standard and
Poors and Moodys, see Annex C.)
It is not only through inflated ratings that investment banks were able to mislead
regulators and their creditors. According Haldane et al. (2010, p. 89) ‘Those banks
with the highest leverage are the also the ones who have reported the largest
write-downs. That suggests banks may have invested in riskier assets, which
regulatory weights failed to capture.’ It seems that banks could - and apparently
did - assign deliberately low risk weights in calculating the capital requirements of
Basel II.i This meant more profits, but much greater vulnerability.
With the world’s most trusted rating agencies misleading investors and the
biggest banks misleading regulators, how long could Finance remain Stable?
Narrative three : A Bank Run
That a fractional reserve bank is exposed to collapse following a ‘run’ by
depositors is a familiar tale. In the classic Diamond-Dybvig (1983) paper, for
example, banks provide ‘liquidity insurance’ for depositors: but panic that
leads to unpredicted depositor withdrawals can induce collapse as the bank is
forced to sell illiquid assets at a loss - unless the Central Bank steps in as
lender of last resort (LOLR), as Bagehot had recommended.
Was the securitisation of loans not, in principle, sufficient to counter this risk?
With securitised assets, a bank that loses deposits need not turn to the Central
Bank for liquidity: it can simply sell the marketable securities it on its balance
10
sheet. While this logic may be true for shocks affecting an individual bank ( as
such idiosyncratic shocks will tend to wash out in aggregate), it fails when
shocks are correlated across many banks. Aggregate shocks will lead to
collective selling, i.e. they will generate adverse pecuniary externalities. In the
Diamond-Dybvig story, the involuntary deleveraging forced upon an individual
bank which loses its funding may lead to its insolvency; with aggregate shocks,
the adverse price effects associated with fire-sales can cause insolvency on a
systemic scale.
How relevant such pecuniary externalities proved is a key element in Adam
Tooze’s account of the financial crisis and its aftermath. So great was the
threat of fire-sales by banks facing funding freezes, he argues, that the Fed had
to act as ‘Global Lender of Last Resort’ to avoid systemic collapse.
If the Fed did not act, what threatened was a transatlantic balance sheet
avalanche, with the Europeans running down their lending in the United
States and selling off their dollar portfolios in a dangerous fire-sale. It was
to hold those portfolios of dollar-denominated assets in place that from
the end of 2007 the Fed began to provide dollar liquidity in
unprecedented abundance not only to the American but to the entire
global financial system, and above all to Europe. Tooze (2018, p. 206 )
Section 2: Two Fallacies of Composition
The twenty-first century financial alchemy - where subprime lending would be
financed by liquid funds from Wall Street - was too good to be true: it involved
fallacies of composition both by the regulators and by the banks. Here’s why.
Regulators who were captured
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ( BCBS), established in 1975,
came to see its mission as devising bank regulations - to be applied country by
country - so as to ensure financial stability in the economies of the West.
Concerns that there might be an international ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of
bank regulation led to the Basel Accord of 1998 with an 8% Capital Adequacy
Requirement to be applied to Risk Weighted Assets. This marked a significant
11
step in coordinating financial regulation among independent sovereign states.
But, as Charles Goodhart (2011, p.581) puts it in concluding his comprehensive
study of the BCSB over the years 1974-97, ‘the key question is: why the
apparatus of financial regulation failed to prevent a systemic failure’.
The view of national bank regulators and the BCBS was, Goodhart notes, that
their duty lay in ‘improving the risk management practices of individual banks’,
leaving out of account the potential externalities, that can threaten financial
stability at a global level. To suppose, as did the Basel Committee, that balance
sheet restrictions (such as Value-at-Risk rules) designed to check risk-taking at
the level of the individual banks would ensure the safety of the global financial
system, is, he argues, an example of the Fallacy of Composition.
Why did the Committee fall into the error of ignoring such externalities?
Goodhart suggests it was ‘intellectually captured’ by the industry it was
regulating. Adam Tooze (2018, pp. 86,7) puts it more strongly:
The regulators were utterly subservient to the logic of the businesses they
were supposed to be regulating. The draft text of what would become the
Basel II regulations was prepared for the Basel Committee by the Institute
for International Finance, the chief lobby group for the global banking
industry …. The FDIC estimated that the introduction of Basel II would
permit big banks to reduce their capital by 22%.
The business model that failed
The essence of the investment banking model was to finance mortgage lending
across the US by raising funds at low rates on Wall Street. Adam Tooze
sketches the mechanics as follows.
On the asset side, the secret was securitization:
The end of the refinancing boom of 2003 in conventional mortgages
triggered the push into unconventional lending…. What the private
securitizers discovered was that if securitizing conventional mortgages
was profitable, subprime was even more so. Tooze (2018 p.60).
On the liability side of the balance sheet, money markets were tapped for
wholesale funding:
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Building a big balance sheet of Mortgage Backed Securities didn’t just
involve risk on the asset side. It also involved expanding the liabilities of
the bank on the funding side. This was the truly lethal mechanism at the
heart of the crisis. Funds from money market cash pools were channelled
into financing the holding of large balance sheets of MBS. Tooze (2018
p.60)
One mechanism used by investment and commercial banks to fund this
lending was to transfer substantial amounts of risk assets ‘off balance sheet’ to
their associated SPVs who would in turn issue commercial paper (repayable
between three months and as little as a few days) backed by the name of the
parent bank. As the capital requirements on the SPVs were far less than would
be required ‘on balance sheet’, this enhanced the return on capital: but by
keeping risky assets effectively inside the banking system, this exposed the
latter to solvency shocks and liquidity runs.
A second mechanism was borrowing directly from the market via repos:
As with commercial paper, repo was exposed to serious funding risk. You
might not be rolled over. Specifically, the risk was that if an investment
bank like Lehman or Bear was thought to have suffered major losses on
some big part of its portfolio it would suffer a general loss of confidence.
It would then … find itself shut out from critical funding. At Lehman at the
end of fiscal year 2007, of its balance of $691b , 50% was funded through
repo. At Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, the share was
40%. If any of these investment banks was to lose access to the repo
market, at a stroke its business model would collapse. Tooze (2018, p.62)
The downside of this business model was that the ending of mortgage boom
would pose an existential threat. And the writing was on the wall:
From 2004, fully half the mortgage loans being fed into the system had
incomplete or zero documentation, and 30% were interest only loans to
people who had no prospect of making basic repayment [and] many of
the subprime mortgages were on balloon rates that would rapidly
increase after a period of two or three years. Tooze (2018, pp. 64 and 70 )
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Section 3: What about the law?
How law courts have handled banking failures differs markedly from country to
country. From this diversity, as Benediktsdottir et al. (2017) politely hint, there
may be lessons to be learned.
In the US: “Deferred Prosecution Agreements”
US courts imposed heavy ‘fines’ on banks and rating agencies for mis-selling and
mis-rating, as reported in Annex C. But the courts have been criticised because, in
contrast to what happened in previous crises – that of Savings-and-Loan
associations in the 1980s and the accounting frauds of the 1990s, for example –
‘not a single high-level executive has been successfully prosecuted in connection
with the recent financial crisis’, Rakoff (2014).
In the article cited, retired Judge Rakoff notes that there has, in fact, been a shift
from prosecuting high-level individuals to prosecuting companies. In order to
change ‘corporate culture’, the policy pursued is to secure Deferred Prosecution
Agreements (DPAs) in which the company, under threat of criminal prosecution,
agrees to pay a fine and to take remedial measures to prevent future wrong-
doing.
As John Kay (2017) observes, however, ‘the very prevalence of such [DPA]
settlements is an indication that their deterrent effect is small. Senior executives
appear not to mind paying out large amounts of shareholders’ money to escape
any personal liability for their actions, or the actions of those whom they
ostensibly supervise’.
The Icelandic approach: transparency and punishment
In Iceland, by contrast, decisive steps were taken to determine what happened
and who was responsible. As reported in Benediktsdottir et al. (2017, pp. 193,
197):
After the 2008 global financial crisis, the Icelandic parliament (Alþingi)
established the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), which was composed
of a supreme court judge, a parliamentary ombudsman, and an economist
to address the basic questions of “What just happened?” and “Were any
public officials responsible for mistakes or negligence?” The investigation
was unique, in that Alþingi lifted all laws on bank secrecy in the public
interest. Therefore, the SIC had unparalleled access to information about all
the banks’ operations, including their loan books, tax information, reports,
and loan committees’ documents and minutes. Moreover, it had subpoena
14
power over bankers and any other relevant parties, such as politicians,
business partners, and regulators. …
Furthermore, Alþingi appointed a special prosecutor to investigate the failed
banks, which resulted in several charges, including against chief executives
of all three of the major banks, all of whom were either sentenced to serve
jail time or still have cases pending.9
Though no evidence of bribery emerged and no corruption charges were
issued by the special prosecutor (with one exception, for insider trading), the
extent of malpractice uncovered by the SIC was daunting, including the
purchase of own shares, illegal lending, breach of trust, and borrowing
substantial sums money from the ECB and the Central Bank of Icelandic
without meaningful collateral10.
As a result, ‘crash-related’ sentences handed down by the Supreme Court
between 2012 and 2015 amounted to 87 prison years for 38 individuals,
including a Deputy Minister of Finance, four Board Chairs, and ten CEOs ( with
some of these senior bank officials getting sentences of 5 to 6 years each),
Akaerur Serstaka spes (2017). There are further sentences handed down by the
District Court, involving 26 prison years for 16 people, still subject to appeal at
the time of writing.
In the UK – a Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards
Legal penalties in the UK could hardly provide a starker contrast: no senior
executives have been prosecuted. In his Reith Lectures, the historian Niall
Ferguson (2013, p. 75) asserted, with only a little exaggeration: ‘the harshest
punishment meted out to a banker was the ‘cancellation and annulment’ of the
former Royal Bank of Scotland CEO Fred Goodwin’ s knighthood’!
For the future, however, he stressed the importance of ensuring that those who
fall foul of regulatory authority pay dearly for their transgressions.
All the detailed regulation in the world will do less to avert a future
financial crisis than the clear and present danger in the minds of today’s
bankers that, if they transgress in the eyes of the authority on whom their
9For more detail see Jonsson and Sigurgeirsson (2017)
10 “It was common practice in Iceland for two banks to swap their debt securities with each other and for each
to use the other’s debt as collateral in their borrowing from the central bank. Such collateral was referred to as
a “love letter”.” Sibert (2010)
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business ultimately depends, then they could go to prison.
Ferguson (2012, pp. 78)
A year after these words were published, however, the Parliamentary
Commission on Banking Standards issued a Report – Changing banking for
good - outlining radical reforms to improve standards across the banking
industry11. Key recommendations include:
• A new Senior Persons Regime to ensure that the most important responsibilities within banks are
assigned to specific, senior individuals so they can be held fully accountable for their decisions and
the standards of their banks in these areas;
• A new licensing regime underpinned by Banking Standards Rules to ensure those who can do serious
harm are subject to the full range of enforcement powers;
• A new criminal offence for Senior Persons of reckless misconduct in the management of a bank,
carrying a custodial sentence;
• A new remuneration code better to align risks taken and rewards received in remuneration, with
much more remuneration to be deferred and for much longer;
• A new power for the regulator to cancel all outstanding deferred remuneration, along with unvested
pension rights and loss of office or change of control payments, for senior bank employees in the
event of their banks needing taxpayer support, creating a major new incentive on bankers to avoid
such risks.
Parliament has recommended that ‘reckless misconduct’ should lead to
imprisonment of senior managers; but the standards of proof required to
establish criminal liability for executives – with funding doubtless available to
marshal top lawyers in their defence - could well stymie this innovation. In
which case, it will be left to ‘clawback’ and other financial penalties that reduce
the private benefits of risk-taking to change managers’ behaviour. Time will
tell.
Conclusion
Failure to bring reckless bankers to justice is likely to have serious political
consequences. Indeed, according to Michael Lewis, in the US it already has.
When interviewed by Gary Silverman for the Financial Times Michael Lewis
expressed the view that the Trump phenomenon was ‘an unfortunate
11 Subsequently, the Prudential Regulatory Authority and Financial Conduct Authority have been developing
Senior Manager and Certification Regimes (SM&CR) to support a change in culture at all levels in the banking
and insurance industries.
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aftershock’ of the financial blunders of the last decade. He went on to
elaborate:
The collapse of the US mortgage market and the subsequent bailout of
the banks left Americans of varying political views feeling that the system
was rigged. I think of this as echoing the 2008 financial crisis. The
marketplace for politicians just did something as weird as the marketplace
for securities did, and it did it in part because of what the market did.
(Gary Silverman, 2016)
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Annex A : cross-border finance - a snapshot
The increasing inter-connections of the global financial system are neatly
illustrated by a graph from Avdjiev et al. (2016). This is shown as Figure A1
below, where the thickness of the arrows indicates the size of the outstanding
stock of claims. As between 2002 and 2007, Europe evidently borrowed an
extra $1.1 trillion in the US, and invested this back again. So, as the authors put
it, ‘the dollars raised by borrowing from US money market funds flowed back
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to the United States through purchases of securities built on subprime
mortgages’.
The fact that the gross exposure of foreign banks was hedged on a currency
basis (by short-term $ borrowing) did not mean that non-US banks were
protected from the US financial crisis. Given the maturity mismatch, they were
seriously exposed to a funding crisis – a demand for dollars that could have led
to firesales and insolvency had the Fed not acted as Global Lender of Last
Resort, see Annex B.
Figure A1 US dollar-denominated cross-border claims (billions of US dollars)
Note: arrows directed from region A to region B indicate lending from banks located in region A to
borrowers located in region B.
Source: Avdjiev et al. (2016)
Annex B Emergency Liquidity and Capital support provided to US banks
Liquidity provision
The US financial system was, unlike Lehman, saved from collapse. Given the
existential threat that meltdown would have represented to the US and other
Western economies, the Fed as LOLR provided liquidity to private banks in the
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US and outside US boundaries too; and made swaps available to other Central
Banks12.
To put the size of intervention in perspective, it is worth beginning with a brief
summary of the exposure of leveraged institutions to subprime mortgages.
Percent of exposure Approx value ($b)
Total of Subprime assets 100% 1,400
Non Leveraged institutions 35% 490
Total leveraged institutions 65% 910
Of which : US 50% 700
Non US 15% 210
Source Shin (2010 p. 153, Table 9.1)
Table B1: Subprime exposure by type of institution
Five facilities provided substantial liquidity to banks, many non-American.
Facility Commercial
Paper
Funding
Facility
(ABCP/CP)
3 month
Term Auction
Facility (TAF)
Single tranche
OMOs
Term
Securities
Lending
Facility (TSLF)
Primary
Dealer Credit
Facility
(PDCF)
(overnight)
Total lending
by facilty
737 6,180 910 2,006 8,951
Total large
banks
253 3,259 910 2,006
Large non-
American
201 1,799 656 1,017 2,072
% non-
American
79% 55% 72% 51% 23%
Source: Tooze (2018,p.216)
Table B2 Fed Liquidity Facilities and Their Users (in $ billions)
The Fed also provided swap lines to other Central Banks
Counter party central bank Raw swap amount Standardised to 28-day swap
ECB 8,011 2,527
Bank of England 919 311
Swiss National Bank 466 244
12 With QE, the Fed also stepped in as ‘market maker’ to buy some of the risk assets the private sector was
selling
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Bank of Japan 387 727
Other Central Banks … …
Total 10,057 4,450
Source (Tooze (2018, p.214)
Table B3 Fed as Global LOLR: Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines, Dec 2007to August2010 (in $ b.)
Treasury support to US Banks Alongside losses and write-downs totalling
$344b incurred in 2007/8, Table B4 provides details of the principal capital
injections made by the US Treasury using TARP funds, running to a total of
almost $100b for the banks in the table.
Table B4 Big Five Investment banks and survivors of the Big Eight: losses, capital injections, fines
The ‘Big Five’
US
Investment
Banks (as of
early 2008)
Assets,
Leverage,
and equity
end 2007
Fate after
crisis
‘Big Eight’
Banks
(Current
Survivors)
Credit losses and
write downs
2007-8
Capital
injections
October
2008
Subsequent
fines for
Mis-selling
of MBS
Goldman
Sachs
$1,120b
(26; $43b)*
Became a
Bank H Co
in Sep 2008
Goldman
Sachs
$10b ( 0.7 )** $10b $5b
Morgan
Stanley
$1,045b
(33; $32b)
Became a
Bank H Co in
Sep 2008
Morgan
Stanley
$19b (2.1 ) $10b $3b
Merrill Lynch $1,020
(32; $32b)
T/O by Bank
of America,
Sep, 2008
Bank of
America
ML: $73b (7.5)
BoA: $57b (1.8)
$25b $17b
(+$37b set
aside)
Lehman Bros $691b
(31; $22b)
Liquidation,
Sep 2008
_ $30b (5.0 ) _ _
Bear Sterns $396b
(33; $12b)
T/O by J P
Morgan, Mar
2008
J P Morgan $41b (2.8 ) $25b $13b
Citigroup $114b (4.0 ) $25b $7b
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Totals $4,272b
IBs only
$344b $95b $45b
Notes: *Figures in brackets are leverage, Assets / Equity, followed by Equity. ** Figure in brackets
shows ratio of losses and write downs to 2006 pre-tax earnings. Sources: Losses: Milne (2009, p.249);
Injections: Sorkin (2009, p.524); Fines: (DoJ web reports)
Annex C Legal penalties imposed on US Investment banks and CRAs
Fines for mis-selling of MBS
The final column of Table B4 indicates the ‘fines’ on the Investment Banks
themselves - settlements agreed to with Federal and/or State prosecutors for
having misled other investors as to the quality of the MBS they sold. The sums
paid by investment banks and the big commercial banks such as Bank of
America, J P Morgan and Citigroup amount to $45b (of which $8b was levied on
the two surviving investment banks, and $20b on the big banks that had taken
over Bear Sterns and Merill Lynch). The largest fines come from the case against
Bank of America which, in addition to acquiring Merill Lynch, had earlier taken
over Countrywide Financial, the largest lender of subprime mortgages in the US.
Fines on CRAs
The allegation of collusion between Credit Rating Agencies and investment banks
has also been the subject of court proceedings. In February, 2015 S&P settled for
a fine of $1.5b – and it was reported that ‘S&P executives admitted that they
made decisions about testing and rating CDOs based at least partly on the effect
they might have on relationships with the banks issuing them’. In January of
2017, Moody’s settled for a sum of $0.9b.
Total 6.6k words
